The "extended mind" thesis (Clark, 2008) has focused primarily on the interactions between single individuals and cognitive artifacts, resulting in a relative neglect of interactions between people. At the same time, the idea that groups can have cognitive properties of their own has gained new ascendancy in various fields concerned with collective behavior. My main goal in this paper is to propose an understanding of group cognition as an emergent form of socially distributed cognition. To that end, I first clarify the relevant notions of cognition and emergence that are at play in the contemporary debate. I then apply our conceptual framework to recent developments in the theory of transactive memory systems (Wegner, 1986) , arguing that the idea of group cognition is neither trivial nor shrouded in metaphysical mystery.
From extended cognition to group cognition
In the past two decades, there has been a flurry of attempts-discussed under multiple guises as situated and distributed cognition-to capture the distinctive roles which bodily, technological, and social-cultural resources play in shaping and augmenting human intelligence (Robbins & Aydede, 2009) . What stands out is that human beings are uniquely talented in modifying their environments through the creation of cognitive artifacts-tools which make us smarter by transforming the nature of otherwise difficult tasks into something more tractable for our "naked" brains (Norman, 1991) . Cognitive artifacts that are well-designed allow us to distribute cognitive activities across time, space, and people (Hutchins, 1995; Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh, 2000) . If the cognitively relevant interactions between brain, body, and environment are sufficiently dense and functionally integrated in the context of specific problemsolving episodes, it becomes increasingly arbitrary to single out the contributions of the external world as mere "inputs" for cognition. In these cases, so the argument goes, the mind itself extends beyond the head into the world (Clark, 2003 (Clark, , 2008 Wilson, 2004) .
The main focus of the "extended mind" thesis has rested on the interactions between solitary individuals and their cognitive artifacts, resulting in a relative neglect of the interactions between people (Barnier et al., 2008; Theiner, 2008) . However, many highly prized activities in our species are accomplished only when we think and act in groups. Can a group constitute a cognitive system in its own right? The "group mind" thesis was a fixture in the intellectual landscape of the late 19 th and early 20 th century (Wilson, 2004) . It crystallized the idea of groups as collective agents, and their gestalt as emergent wholes that are more than the sum of their parts. To its own detriment, many traditional formulations of this idea remained highly speculative and often bordered on the occult. As a result, the "group mind" concept quickly fell out of favor with the rise of behaviorism in psychology, since it remained notoriously unclear where the "group mind" was supposed to reside, and how we could measure it (Wegner, 1986) . Despite its historical ballast, the idea that groups can have irreducible cognitive properties of their own has gained new ascendancy in a range of fields concerned with collective behavior (Burke, 1989; Walsh & Ungson, 1991; Larson & Christensen, 1993; Hutchins, 1995; Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Wilson, 2002; Argote, 1999; Couzin, 2007; List, 2008) . In this paper, I present a multi-level framework in which group cognition is analyzed as an emergent form of socially distributed cognition. For that purpose, I first clarify the notions of cognition and distribution that are at play in the contemporary debate. To show that the appeal to group cognition is neither trivial nor vexed with metaphysical puzzles, I will then take a fresh look at the literature on transactive memory systems through the lens of our distributed-cognition framework.
What is socially distributed cognition?
What classifies a system S as cognitive? A "big-tent" approach to a notion of cognition suited to make sense of contemporary appeals to group cognition ought to satisfy several constraints.
First, we need a notion of cognition that is not bio-centric, i.e., a notion which is not essentially tied to the physical substrate of cognitive processes occurring inside the sheath of biological organisms. In philosophy, the putative substrate-neutrality of mental properties is commonly associated with functionalist theories of mind (Block, 1996) . Broadly speaking, functionalist theories of mind claim that what makes something a mental state (of a particular type) does not depend on what it is made of, but rather on the way in which it functions in the system to which it belongs.
A second desideratum is to analyze the notion of cognition as a cluster concept which subsumes a more or less loosely knit family of capacities that we can distinguish for taxonomic purposes. The possession of each capacity enables its bearer to engage in a distinctive range of behaviors that we associate with intelligence. Taken together, they provide a set of diagnostic criteria that allow us to classify and compare various systems in terms of their cognitive powers (see also Poirier & Chicoisne, 2006) .
To exemplify the "big tent" approach we have in mind, consider the following list of properties P which contribute to the cognitive nature of a system S:
1. AD (adaptability): S can adapt its behavior to changing environments. 2. IP (information-processing): S can process information from its environment. 3. H (heed): S can selectively and purposefully attend to its environment. 4. IT (intentionality): S can create internal representations of its environment. 5. E (extension): S can modify its environment through the creation of artifacts. 6. R (self-reflexivity): S can become aware of itself as a cognitive agent. 7. C (consciousness): S can have conscious experiences of itself and the world.
These capacities can be used to define a scale by which we can rank cognitive systems according to how many of the suggested capacities they possess-their degree of "mindfulness." In this paper, my discussion shall be confined to group cognition in the sense of levels 1-5.
Turning to the next question, we have to ask: when do we have reason to speak of a group as a cognitive system, as opposed to a mere collection of thinking individuals? Our intuition that a distinction must be made between genuine systems (e.g., a biological cell) and mere aggregates (e.g., a heap of stones) is epitomized in the popular slogan that systems are emergent wholes which are "more than the sum of their parts." Accepting this seductive but not very helpful formulation sets up a familiar arms race between "holism" and "atomism." As a result, the search for emergent properties turns into a quest for the 'holy grail' which (for the holist) must forever remain beyond the reach of mechanistic explanation. Wimsatt (1986) has argued that this kind of arms race is based on a false dilemma between emergence and reduction, which arises from an inadequate understanding of aggregative vs. non-aggregative modes of composition. He defines the emergence of complex system properties as a failure of their "aggregativity," and thus exhibiting a strong form of organization-dependence. His idea can be stated as follows. Let s 1 to s m stand for the m components of a system S (relative to some decomposition D); p 1 to p n for the n properties of S's components; and F for the organization or mode of interaction between p i (s j ), such that a system property P(S) is determined by the composition function: P(S) = F[p i (s j ) for i = 1 to n, and j = 1 to m]. For P(S) to be purely aggregative, it must satisfy conditions 1-4 below; otherwise, it exhibits degrees of emergence.
1. IS: P(S) is invariant under the inter-substitution of parts of S, or any other parts taken from a relevantly similar domain 2. QS: P(S) remains qualitatively similar (differing only in value) under the addition or subtraction of parts 3. DR: P(S) is invariant under the decomposition and reaggregation of parts 4. CI: There are no cooperative or inhibitory interactions among parts
Wimsatt's conception undermines the false dilemma between emergent "holism" and atomistic "nothing-butism." First, emergence is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but comes in degrees. Perfectly aggregative properties (e.g., the mass of a heap of stones) turn out to be quite rare in nature. Second, although emergent system properties are highly organization-dependent, they are nevertheless mechanistically explicable in terms of the properties of and interactions among its parts. This can be gleaned from the fact that Wimsatt's definition of emergence presupposes the existence of a composition function. But third, complex systems with emergent properties fail to be "neardecomposable" in the sense of Simon (1969) . Because the overall behavior of an emergent system property is largely determined by the interactions among its elements, we cannot hope to understand it by first dividing up the entire system into a number of independently working component units, characterizing the contributions of these units as if they were isolated from each other, and then adding up their contributions by associating them with specific aspects of what the system does as a whole. Emergent properties are outside the reach of the classic explanatory strategies of decomposition and localization (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993) .
In light of our analysis, we shall say that a group S is a socially distributed cognitive system of kind k in case it has cognitive properties P k (S) that are emergent relative to a decomposition of S into its members, their behavioral and psychological properties, and their modes of social interaction.
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The curious case of transactive memory
In various fields of research on small group performance, there has been a growing trend to consider teams-small groups who actively collaborate in the pursuit of a common goal, with a purposeful differentiation of roles-as the seats of cognition and knowledge in their own right (Mohammed & Dumville, 2001 ). For instance, Larson & Christensen (1993) characterize team-level cognition in terms of the social interactions involved in the collective acquisition, storage, transmission, manipulation, and use of information for the performance of cognitive tasks (e.g., judgment, inference, decision-making, memory). From a distributedcognition perspective, Hollan et al. (2000) argue that the social organization of a team-together with the artifacts and material structure added by the concrete context of collective activity-can itself be viewed as part of the team's cognitive architecture, since it determines recurrent patterns in which information is propagated and transformed within the group.
At this point, I should point out an important caveat about the idea of team cognition. Within social psychology, the term 'team cognition' has sometimes been used to mean "socially shared cognition." But this usage is misleading because the meaning of 'shared' is ambiguous between having-in-common and to apportion. Failing to distinguish between these two meanings masks an important difference in the research agendas underlying two different kinds of approaches to group cognition (Muhammed & Dumville, 2001) . Understood in the former sense, 'team cognition' is usually taken to refer to the cognitive similarity, consensus, and shared mental models among individual team members. While these aspects are certainly among the causes and effects of effective group behavior, our framework suggests that they cannot be the hallmark of truly emergent group cognition. Instead, it is more plausible to view them as instances of socially "manifested" individual cognition, i.e., those cognitive properties of a person which are partly constituted by her participation in certain types of social interactions (Barnier et al., 2008) . However, there is another sense in which two people can 'share' their workload by dividing it up, which refers to the distribution and integration of unshared resources. Our own theoretical emphasis lies squarely on this latter aspect of team cognition. To illustrate the idea of socially distributed cognition, I shall now discuss a paradigm within collective memory research that has been specifically designed to study the cognitive implications of pooling diverse-butcomplementary bodies of information: the theory of transactive memory systems.
The development of TMS in workgroups
When people regularly have to remember things together as a group-such as intimate couples, families, or work teams do-they tend to develop a division of cognitive labor, assuming that each member can reliably access the desired information from others on a need-to-know basis. To study the functional organization of memory as a team-level phenomenon, Wegner, Giuliano, & Hertel (1985; see also Wegner 1986 ) introduced the notion of a transactive memory system (TMS). A TMS generally consists of two components: a representational component which is the sum total of individual memories, including personal as well as transactive meta-memories about who knows what; and a procedural component which includes all types of direct and indirect communication processes by which members cooperatively allocate, encode, retrieve, elaborate, and share information. For instance, allocating memory items and encoding responsibilities between group members, the semantic elaboration of memories in group discussion, or interactive cueing are physically constitutive vehicles of transactive memory procedures which partly occur outside people's heads. Other than directly measuring group performance (e.g., collective recall), how can we track a team-level cognitive construct such as TMS?
There is a long tradition in small-group research to focus on cognitive tasks which can straightforwardly be completed by individuals working alone (e.g., multiple choice tests, word recall). A major reason for choosing those types of tasks is that they allow us to draw straightforward comparisons between groups and theoretically interesting "asocial" baseline models of individual performance (e.g., truth wins, better than best member). However, this narrow focus limits the significance of these comparisons to situations in which teamwork is-from a practical point of view-strictly optional. Many cognitive tasks in the real world-as encountered in ship navigation, air traffic control centers, or assembly plants--are invariably performed in groups because there is simply far too much and too variegated information to be processed in relatively short time intervals.
To study the productivity of task-oriented groups in the lab, Moreland and colleagues develop a research program in the mid-1990s in which small groups are trained to perform collaborative tasks (Moreland, 1999) . These tasks are deliberately chosen to resemble the kinds of tasks that are typically encountered in manufacturing organizations which lend themselves to a division of labor. What makes their studies interesting for us is that they have yielded a compact experimental methodology (the "assembly-task" paradigm) to measure the impact of a TMS.
As an example, consider a study conducted by Liang, Moreland, & Argote (1995) in which three-person, same-sex groups had to assemble a radio from a commercially available electronics kit. During the training session, groups were either trained working together or alone, but without any difference in the content of instruction. During the testing session (one week later), each group was first asked to recall collectively how the radio has to be assembled. Then each group was given 30 minutes to assemble a radio as quickly as possible, but with as few errors as possible, and without being allowed to consult the recall sheet or receiving any other help. The goal of their study was to show how the experience of working together as a group can stimulate the development of a TMS that improves their collective performance.
As predicted, Liang et al. found that groups whose members were trained together to assemble radios recalled more steps of the procedure and produced radios with fewer errors than when trained alone. The benefits of group training may seem surprising at first, because there is strong independent evidence that interacting groups often perform worse than the sum of their parts (i.e., nominal aggregations of individuals working alone) in collective recall and brainstorming tasks-an effect known as collaborative inhibition (Weldon & Bellinger, 1997) . The most cited cause of collaborative inhibition is retrieval interference, in which listening to others recall disrupts one's individual retrieval strategies. Other causes may include social loafing, evaluation apprehension, a bias towards shared information to receive social validation, or selfish motives to withhold information (Hollingshead & Brandon, 2003) . However, we should bear in mind that an assembly procedure is an accuracy task which can quite easily be segregated into parts for which group members can acquire differential areas of expertise, and which is naturally carried out in a collaborative fashion. Moreover, it is known that collaborative inhibition is minimized in dyads which have successfully developed a TMS (Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991) .
In order to infer that a TMS indeed acted as a mediator of group performance, Liang et al. had to open the "black box" of group cognition (Fig. 1) . In their analysis, TMS is treated as a latent variable hypothesized to underlie three cognitive manifestations that were found to be positively correlated with each other and group performance: memory differentiation (M1), the tendency of group members to specialize in recalling distinct aspects of the assembly process; task credibility (M2), how much members trusted one another's expertise (associated with behavioral measures such as less need to overtly claim expertise, better acceptance of procedural suggestions, less criticism); and task coordination (M3), the ability of group members to work together more smoothly (measured e.g., by less need for explicit planning, fewer misunderstandings, greater cooperation). Two judges independently rated the groups on each factor based on a list of specific behaviors, and the combined scores were used to create a composite index denoting TMS-activity. Three other, potentially relevant but non-psychological social variables-which were not believed to reflect any single latent variable-were also measured by the same indirect approach: task motivation, i.e., how enthusiastic members were to win the prize for best assembly; group cohesion, i.e., the level of interpersonal attraction among members; and social identity, i.e., the tendency of individuals to perceive themselves as members of a group.
All three hypothesized factors of TMS were found to be significantly higher in the group training condition, whereas of the social factors, only the social identity scores were significantly raised. Finally, a multiple regression analysis confirmed that TMS, but not social identity, mediated the influence of group training on work performance. This shows that group training improved the quality of the workgroup because it fostered the development of TMS, but not because it led to stronger group identities.
More on measuring TMS
A drawback of Liang et al.'s method of measuring TMS by having two judges rate factors M1-M3 is that it does not transfer well from the lab to field settings. For one, it depends on the availability of judges who are very knowledgeable in the relevant target domain. Moreover, the behavioral measures for M1-M3 on which the judges' evaluations are based depend on criteria that do not generalize across different tasks. A scale that is constructed entirely of task-independent items based on participating group members' reports would be a much more feasible way to measure TMSs in the field.
Lewis (2003) has subsequently developed and validated a 15-item TMS scale for field research. As before, her measurement model treats TMS as a second-order latent factor that is indicated by the three first-order factors M1-M3. Each of the first-order factors is indicated by five different scale items which include both member-focused and team-focused items. To obtain team-level data, individual members' responses to the scale are aggregated. Conceptually, this procedure makes sense. For instance, a high aggregate score on the member-focused item "I have knowledge about an aspect of the project that no other team member has" indicates a high degree of memory differentiation within the group, as well as a corresponding shared awareness of member-expertise associations. Notice that this aggregation procedure only concerns a method of gathering data about TMS that is based on members' reports about M1-M3. As we shall see below, it does not imply that TMS itself as a group-level phenomenon satisfies Wimsatt's conditions for aggregativity. Statistically, Lewis used a standardized similarity metric to show that there was substantial agreement among members' responses to all three subscales. Using chi-square difference tests to evaluate model fit, Lewis performed several confirmatory factor analyses for the hypothesized three-factor TMS model which revealed a good fit for both individual and team-level data-one that was significantly better than for alternative one-factor and two-factor solutions.
In sum, the results of Lewis' analysis suggest that her TMS scale is internally consistent, positively correlated with the previously established measure of using judges' observational ratings (convergent validity), properly related to causes and effects as well as alternative measures (criterion-related validity), and unrelated to theoretically distinct constructs (discriminant validity). Wegner (1986) claimed that a TMS is "a knowledgeacquiring, knowledge-holding, and knowledge-using system that is greater than the sum of its individual member systems." Based on our conceptual framework, we are now in a position to flesh out this assertion in greater detail.
TMS as an emergent cognitive system
To begin with, how should we conceive of the relationship between TMS and M1-M3? One might be inclined to say that in the experiments, M1-M3 covary because TMS is their proximate common cause (Lewis, 2003 ). Yet there is something fishy about that interpretation. Causation relates wholly distinct events in time. But as defined by Wegner, M1-M3 are related to TMS as parts of a complex whole at any given time during which a TMS exists. Hence if we were to conceive of TMS and M1-M3 as links of a causal chain, this would imply that at one and the same time, a complex whole causally affects the constituent parts on which its existence depends. This would lead to an incoherent "synchronic" form of self-causation.
Conceptually, it is more plausible to view a TMS as an emergent group phenomenon that is jointly realized by M1-M3. Physical realization is a non-causal relation between the functional properties of a system and their instantiation in a material substrate. The TMS enacted by a group is emergent with respect to the behavioral and psychological properties of its members, because its operation crucially depends on their modes of social interaction.
Let us now consult our set of diagnostic criteria to determine in what sense the development of a TMS underwrites our claim that groups can have cognitive properties of their own. To show that a TMS satisfies conditions IP and H, let us consider the six steps of grouplevel information processing distinguished by Larson & Christensen (1993) . First, for the group to recognize that there is a problem that can only be solved together as a group, members have to become aware that others in the group also perceive the same problem. Second, the group must arrive at a shared conceptualization of this problem. This requires knowing what kinds of knowledge will be relevant for solving the problem, the ways in which this information can be manipulated and combined, and what kinds of solutions would be acceptable. Third, the ways in which group members' time and effort are allocated to acquire specific types of information reveals how much the group as a whole is paying attention to different categories of information. Fourth, members must have accurate metaknowledge about who is responsible for knowing what to coordinate their contributions. Fifth, the induced division of labor increases the chances of unique information that is unknown to other members to be retrieved. Sixth, groups must be able to process unique information appropriately (e.g., in the form of group deliberation) such that it impacts the quality of their collective endeavor.
Concerning condition IT, in what sense do groups have a representational capacity of their own, over and above the representational capacities of their members? We have seen how the memory resources ("vehicles") which are jointly sufficient to realize the states and processes of a TMS are distributed across the members of the group. The relevant sense of distribution here, I shall now argue, is that of emergence as organization-dependence.
To see this, consider the question: who remembers how to assemble (e.g.) a radio? For the sake of the argument, let us assume that a successful performance of this task requires a mixed body of partly declarative, partly procedural memories about a complex procedure that no team member knows how to perform in its entirety as an individual. For instance, imagine that member A knows how to insert all the mechanical components into the circuit board, B knows how to handle the electronic components, and C knows how to connect each component to all the others in the proper manner. Because of their differentiated expertise, Wimsatt's condition IS fails. It might be argued that each expert could in principle be replaced by hiring and training an individual taken from "a domain of relevantly similar parts." However, as Wimsatt (1986) has pointed out in a related context, the relevant equivalence class of parts must be characterized in terms of the intrinsic properties which the substituted parts have regardless of their organizational arrangement. By definition, this excludes the differentiation of expertise which is imposed socially by a division of labor. Condition QS fails, because taking out enough members who possess critical but unshared knowledge would effectively lesion the TMS and drastically reduce group performance. Since the TMS of a group which has been trained together markedly differs from the TMS of group whose members are trained individually (and then put together), condition DR is violated. Finally, condition CI fails, since members' awareness of how expertise is distributed affects their individual likelihood of acquiring, recalling, and communicating memory items pertaining to specific categories of information.
TMS as a collective learning system
So far, we have looked at TMSs as collective repositories of task-specific knowledge that make groups better at doing the kinds of things which they were initially trained to do. But can a TMS also help groups to apply their previous knowledge to new tasks in related domains, and acquire a deeper understanding of the problem space as a result of this application? Within our framework, this would provide strong support for the claim that group cognition satisfies condition AD. Extending the range of the assembly-task paradigm, Lewis, Lange, and Gillis (2005) studied the effect of TMS on group learning, learning transfer, and adaptation to changing task demands. Underlying their "learning-bydoing" framework is the assumption that every task performance that is mediated by a group's previously induced TMS provides a learning environment which changes formerly established TMS structures and processes, and thereby enables the group to acquire new problemsolving skills. This assumption is supported by the following consideration. The performance of task 1 (the original "learning task," e.g., assembling a radio) comprises a second learning cycle which should affect the existing TMS in several ways. First, it allows group members to revise and recalibrate their beliefs about who knows what, based on immediate feedback for their performance as individuals and as a group. Second, it provides an opportunity for group members to elaborate and contextualize their transactive memories, based on how their own task-related knowledge relates to other members' jobs, roles, and expertise. Shared conceptualizations of interrole knowledge have been shown to enhance group coordination and performance (Marks et al., 2002) . Third, it also creates more specific expectations about how transactive memory procedures are likely to unfold, which invites the gradual development of regularized habits. In sum, the resulting re-organization of TMS primes a group for the transfer of learning across tasks, which is known to depend on (i) the recognition of functional similarities across problems, and (ii) the ability to map prior knowledge and problem-solving strategies to the new problem (Bassok, 1990 ).
The performance of task 2 (the "transfer task"), which is different from but pertains to the same domain as task 1, comprises a third learning cycle. First, the interactive cueing processes which are characteristic of efficient TMSs prompt group members to draw explicit comparisons across tasks, which heightens their ability to recognize structural commonalities. The analogical encoding of two different but structurally similar problems promotes the occurrence of knowledge transfer and abstract understanding (Gentner, Loewenstein, & Thompson, 2003) . Second, the growing refinement of streamlined inter-role knowledge supports collective induction, i.e., the process by which groups collectively infer general principles underlying a task domain (Laughlin, 1999) . In sum, groups with a history of utilizing their TMS in a variety of related tasks should be better at inferring the underlying principles of the task domain (task 3, the "knowledge task") than groups that have never developed a TMS.
In addition, the suggested framework lends itself to investigate the effects of disrupting an existing TMSdefined as changes in group membership which re-partition their division of cognitive labor and thus affect the accuracy of transactive memories-on TMS-learning and learning transfer. Previous research about TMSs showed that intimate couples performed worse than pairs of strangers on recall tasks when transactive encoding responsibilities were explicitly assigned by an experimenter, because the arbitrarily imposed division of labor interfered with the implicitly established TMS (Hollingshead, 1998; Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991) .
As predicted, the study by Lewis et al. revealed that groups who have brought their TMS to bear on two (or more) different but related tasks are more likely to develop abstract domain knowledge, and suffer more from severe disruptions of its established TMS structure. However, the development of TMS in groups who had only utilized it earlier in a single task did not have the predicted effect on learning transfer. These findings are consistent with earlier research on learning at the individual level, which suggests that experience with only one task may not be sufficient for a subject to detect the underlying analogies between superficially dissimilar problems (Gentner, Loewenstein, & Thompson, 2003) . Further analysis revealed a significant interactive effect between group type and expertise stability. An intact prior TMS was most beneficial for learning transfer in groups whose members had been reassigned but kept their expertise specialization. On the other hand, an intact prior TMS was detrimental for groups when expertise stability across tasks was low-either because members had been reassigned, or the groups abandoned their initial distribution of expertise (see also Lewis et al., 2007) .
Building a technologically extended TMS
The development of TMS does not easily scale from the level of small groups to the level of large organizations (Moreland, 1999) . Due to the sheer size and complexity of organizations, the operations which individuals have to perform to create and maintain a TMS-meta-memory directory updating, information allocation, and retrieval coordination-exceed our biological memory capacities. Moreover, there are specific features of organizational memory (OM) which have hampered the design of knowledge management systems designed to overcome these limitations.
Following Walsh and Ungson (1991) , OM can be retained in five different types of media: individuals, who store beliefs and values in their biological memory; culture, which stores knowledge externally in the form of language and artifacts; the rules and procedures in which organizational routines are embedded; the assignment of social roles; and the physical settings of the workplace. This implies that OM is physically heterogeneous and thus difficult to aggregate, context-dependent and thus not easily transferrable across internal departmental boundaries, tacit and thus hard to communicate, volatile due to frequent membership turnovers, and hard to validate because of the anonymity of the knowledge source. In response to these challenges, Nevo and Wand (2005) presented a template for a computerized information architecture that is directly inspired by Wegner's conception of a TMS. The core of their proposal is to encode the transactive dimensions of OM into a meta-memory directory which contains information about the available types and instances of OM, their physical location, and several categories of metaknowledge associated with an item (e.g., the credibility of its source, the costs of retrieving it, etc.). This is a sensible idea, because the volatility of meta-knowledge in an organization is bound to be lower than that of the first-order knowledge held by frequently changing members.
The design of such a knowledge management system nicely illustrates the double nature of a genuine cognitive artifact (Norman, 1991) . From the view of an individual user who interacts with the organization through the artifact, it completely transforms the nature of the memory tasks she has to perform. For instance, to retrieve specific items of information, a user can systematically query the metamemory base to pre-select those sources of knowledge which she will be able to interpret most easily, and is thus more likely to adopt. From a systemic perspective, the information system amplifies the long-term memory performance of an organization (e.g., knowledge transfer) if it successfully compensates for the lack of shared tacit metaknowledge found only in small groups. To maintain the meta-memory directory, Nevo and Wand recommend to encode as much TMS as possible early on (e.g., identify the relevant experts for each topic), and then have each department go through periodical updates.
In their defense of the "extended mind" thesis, Clark and Chalmers (1998) suggested a number of "coupling conditions" which bio-external resources have to satisfy in order to be considered as part of an agent's extended cognitive apparatus: that the external resource be reliably available and typically deployed when confronted with the task at hand, that any relevant information contained in the resource should be easily accessible, and that any information retrieved from the external device should be more-or-less automatically endorsed and treated as a trustworthy source. In the present context, I would argue that similar considerations ought to apply not only to individuals, but also to groups. If successfully implemented, the resulting organization-wide TMS would thus qualify as a socially distributed cognitive system that satisfies condition E on our cognitive scale. Its physical realization is spread not only across people and their biological memories, but encompasses their interactions with external representational technologies.
Conclusion
In their brief history of the "group mind" thesis, Wegner et al. (1985) pointed out that the attribution of mentality to groups was meant to crystallize three properties of groups. First, the idea was used to capture the homogeneity and likemindedness of group members-their similar beliefs and attitudes, a shared language, and shared cultural values. Second, cognitive concepts were applied to groups in order to emphasize their collective agency, such as their capacity to remember, deliberate, make decisions, pursue goals, and react sensibly in response to change. Third, attributions of mentality were meant to convey that a group is more than the sum of its parts, that it has emergent properties which cannot be reduced to the minds and actions of individuals. Unfortunately, many traditional expressions of the "group mind" thesis remained highly speculative and even bordered on the occult.
In this paper, I have argued that the theory of distributed and extended cognition provides an attractive framework to analyze claims about group-level cognitive activity. Such a reconstruction has the benefit of retaining some valuable insights of the "group mind" thesis, but without taking on any of its excessive metaphysical baggage. Our account preserves the intuition that groups can have emergent cognitive properties that are different from the cognitive properties had by its individual members. But it also departs from earlier versions in several crucial respects.
First, the present proposal departs from the idea that within-group similarity and like-mindedness-"the mass movements of a crowd, the majority decisions of the electorate, or the sweetly homogeneous mindlessness of people in love" (Wegner, 1986 )-must be the defining mark of group cognition. While the social alignment of shared beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors are certainly among the prerequisites of group cognition, it is rather the integration of diverse but complementary aspects of knowledge that is directly responsible for the emergent cognitive properties of groups.
Second, the worry that group minds are either "nothing but" collections of individual minds or doomed to inhabit preternatural realms arises from a false dilemma between atomistic conceptions of reduction and implausibly strong conceptions of emergence. Social coordination and communication processes are not properly speaking causes and effects of a "hidden" group mind that is located elsewhere, but function as beyond-the-head parts of the physical mechanisms by means of which group cognition is realized.
The suggested reasons for moving the relevant unit of cognitive analysis (of group behavior) from an individual to a collective level tie our account into the more general framework of distributed and extended cognition (Clark, 2003; Wilson, 2004) . Reflecting on the nature of the resources by which extended cognitive systems are assembled, cognitive systems and processes can be distributed along three principal dimensions, each of which provides its own forms of "scaffolding" for the mind (Hollan et al., 2000) : (i) in space, insofar as environmental (natural or technological) structures transform the nature of the cognitive tasks which our biological brains and bodies have to perform; (ii) over time, insofar as the outcomes of earlier stages of cognitive processing transform the task demands during the later stages; and (iii) socially, insofar as membership in a social group transforms the nature of the cognitive tasks which an individual has to perform. While the focus of this paper has been the social dimension of cognitive extension, the underlying analysis of distribution as a form of emergence can be generalized across all three dimensions.
